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Abstract 
 
Analysing profitability in the SCUTs: excessive returns and 
renegotiations 
 
Marine Ribeiro Santos 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to study the existence of excessive returns in the Shadow tolls Road 
projects (SCUTs) in Portugal, exploiting the feasibility of renegotiating the contracts providing 
excessive rents at the government’s benefice. The study analyses evidence on excessive 
returns by using a profitability assessment methodology, consisting in comparing an accurate 
profitability measure with a suitable benchmark. For the SCUTs showing evidence on excessive 
returns, renegotiations scenarios where these returns are readjusted to the “fair” level are 
constructed and simulated. We find that four of the seven SCUTs in Portugal – Interior Norte, 
Algarve, Beiras Litoral e Alta and Norte Litoral – show evidence on excessive returns for the 
period after the new payment model implementation (in 2010). We further estimate that 
renegotiating the State payments for these SCUTs permits savings of €837 Million in the 
aggregate SCUTs payments’ present value. We also find that such levels of cut in the State 
payments lower the debt service coverage ratio of certain projects below the security level. 
Imposing renegotiations where the capacity of the firms to pay the debt is not threaten reduce 
the value of savings to €631Million.  
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I. Introduction 
In the last decades, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have gained significant importance 
worldwide. In several developed and emerging countries, traditional public investment has 
been progressively substituted by the use of PPPs. One of the main drivers of this 
enhancement is the fact that PPPs allow governments to engage in huge infrastructure 
reforms requiring massive investments, even at moments where public funding is not 
available. Moreover, the use of private sector skills in order to increase the efficiency of the 
investments has been pointed out as another reason for the PPPs’ choice.  
Portugal was, in 2009, the European country with the largest amount of investment in PPPs as 
a percentage of GDP1. Presently, the country has €16 024 Million invested in partnerships 
contracts, and €20 501 Million in concession contracts2. Altogether, this accounts for a total 
investment of €36 525 Million which is equivalent to 23% of the national GDP (2011) and 46% 
of Government Budget spending (2012)3. Nevertheless, aside from all the advantages that 
infrastructure development could carry on, one has to consider that the amounts invested in 
PPPs are always converted into future obligations for the government, and consequently for 
the taxpayers. Currently, the present value of these obligations in Portugal reaches €26.005 
Million (gross value) which represents around 15% of the National GDP (2011)4. With the debt 
crisis the country is facing, it seems that the affordability of the financial obligations associated 
to PPPs can be threatened. Hence the necessity of a deep review of the PPPs contracts has 
become urgent. In the Memorandum of Understanding negotiated between the government 
and international institutions (EU/ECB/IMF), several measures related to PPPs are stipulated, 
namely the need to: “(…) assess the feasibility to renegotiate any PPP or concession contract to 
reduce the Government financial obligations”5.  
However, to renegotiate PPPs contracts in order to effectively lessen the amount of 
obligations for the state is a complex request. The legal agreements in place are made to 
prevent possible damages in terms of financial equilibrium for each of the parties involved, 
which can represent a barrier to renegotiations. There are three main agents involved in the 
PPPs’ renegotiation process: the Government, the private firms allocated to the project and 
                                                     
1
 European Investment Bank 
2
 According to GASEPC – Gabinete de Acompanhamento do Sector Empresarial do Estado, Parcerias e Concessões, 
2012. Parcerias Público Privadas e concessões Boletim Informativo 4º trimestre 2011, Lisbon 
3
 See www.imf.org for the value of Portuguese GDP 2011 and www.dgo.pt for the value of Government Budget 
Spending. Authors’ calculations. 
4
 According to GASEPC – Gabinete de Acompanhamento do Sector Empresarial do Estado, Parcerias e Concessões, 
2011. Parcerias Público Privadas e concessões Relatório 2011, Lisbon 
5
 VV.AA, 2011. Portugal: Memorandum Of Understanding On Specific Economic Policy Conditionality pp. 12b 
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the banks engaged in the project financing. Each of these actors is impacted differently by the 
outcome of a renegotiation. An important question is that whatever the change in the contract 
is, the financial equilibrium of the project must be maintained during the length of the 
agreement, as well as the financial conditions for the banks involved. 
In an attempt to reach a better understanding of government-led renegotiations’ impact on 
each agent’s payoff and on the project’s profitability, this thesis intends to analyse the 
possibility of renegotiations in the Shadow toll Road projects (SCUTs – Sem Custo para o 
Utilizador) in Portugal. We study the SCUTs because they are currently the main target of 
renegotiations in Portugal and because the PPPs road sector is the most important in terms of 
amount invested and state obligations6. In this context, we propose as starting point of our 
analysis that the SCUTs potentially providing excessive returns are those where there are room 
for renegotiations, by means of readjusting these returns to the “fair” return. Our main 
research questions are:  
- Is there evidence, from the profitability analysis of the SCUTs projects in Portugal, that 
point towards the existence of excessive returns? 
- In case of strong evidence on excessive returns, which are the impacts of renegotiating 
the state payments to the “fair” level on: 1) Government financial obligations; 2) Project 
profitability; 3) Project’s Debt Service Coverage Ratio? 
In order to conduct our study we perform a profitability analysis of each one of the SCUTs 
projects, both historical (before the introduction of real tolls) and forecasted (according to the 
current agreements of state future payments). Then, we analyse possible scenarios of 
renegotiation that emerge from the profitability analysis and discuss their impact on the three 
main agents involved. Our profitability analysis is based on financial and economic literature 
on general firm valuation, valuation of public utilities and competition regulation. We rely on 
the methodology used in studies for the UK Office of Fair Trading7, consisting in the 
comparison of projects’ profitability against a suitable benchmark. The understanding of 
accurate measures of profitability and benchmarks was mainly based on the discussions 
provided by Fisher and McGowan (1983), Kay (1976), Edwards et al. (1987) and Copeland 
(1978). Further discussion on differences between excess and excessive returns was found in 
Grout and Zalewska (2008).  
                                                     
6
 According to GASEPC – Gabinete de Acompanhamento do Sector Empresarial do Estado, Parcerias e Concessões, 
2011. Parcerias Público Privadas e concessões Relatório 2011, Lisbon 
7
 Relevant Study: OXERA, 2003. Assessing profitability in competition policy analysis, OFT Economic Discussion Paper 
6, July.  
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This thesis demonstrates that four of the seven SCUTs projects in Portugal show currently 
evidence on excessive returns, according to the methodology used. These are Interior Norte, 
Algarve, Beiras Litoral e Alta and Norte Litoral. Hence these results point towards the 
possibility to renegotiate the financial obligations of the State with these projects, by 
readjusting the returns to the non-excessive level. Without accounting for the decrease of the 
debt service coverage ratio below the security level (that we assume as being 1,1) resulting 
from renegotiations, the proposed renegotiation strategy enable the government to save 
globally €837 Million in present value of future payments. When we restrict the extent of the 
renegotiations to a level that guarantees the security threshold of the Debt Service Coverage 
Ratio the amount of total savings achieve €630 Million in terms of present value of future 
payments.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the relevant 
literature. Section III presents the methodology detailing the data, the profitability assessment 
procedure and the renegotiations scenarios construction. Further, Section IV presents the 
results achieved in terms of historical and forecasted profitability and on the suggested 
renegotiations. Finally, in Section V we present the conclusion, limits and further work.  
 
II. Literature Review 
In this chapter, we first provide a brief definition of PPPs and a discussion of their main drivers. 
Then, concerning our further profitability analysis we describe in detail the different 
approaches to calculate excessive returns, looking at the different profitability measurements 
and how they are used to assess for excessive rents. 
2.1. Public-Private Partnerships 
According Grimsey and Lewis (2002: 108) PPPs can be defined as the “…an agreement where 
the public sector enters into long-term contractual agreements with private sector entities for 
the construction or management of public sector infrastructure facilities by the private sector 
entity, or the provision of services (using infrastructure facilities) by the private sector entity to 
the community on behalf of a public sector entity.”  
The drivers of the use of PPPs as a substitute of traditional public investment were discussed 
by Anumba et al. (2000).  As driver of the public partner, they point out the fact that PPPs 
allow governments to engage in infrastructure development even at moments of borrowing 
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constraints. This is possible as investment in PPPs does not require raise of public funding and 
does not enter in the budget as debt, but as future financial obligations (the off-balance 
argument). Another driver of the PPPs’ use is related with its potential efficiency increase in 
providing utilities, comparing with traditional public investment. This gain on efficiency should 
result from the incentives of the private side – whose objective is the maximization of profit – 
properly set through a given level of risk-sharing between the public and the private side. This 
gain on efficiency would lead to the achievement of higher value-for-money on investment. 
This argument has been widely debated by several authors, as Akintoye et al. (2003) who 
suggested that higher efficiency in PPPs is only verified under specific conditions, tough to 
guarantee in all situations. In what concerns the private side, the main drivers presented by 
Anumba et al. (2000) are essentially high returns on investments and profitability of the 
project. This usually results from the risk-sharing agreement behind the PPP contract. On one 
hand, it is related to the fact part of the investment is funded by debt that can be borrowed at 
low rates as payments by the public sector are of low risk. On the other hand, because the 
pattern of cash-flows itself follows a steady stream and is, at least partially, rid of demand risk.  
Actually, it is worth looking at this feature of PPPs usually providing high returns for the private 
side. Kuehnle (1972) has discussed public utilities valuation, namely in the case of private-
owned companies. The author suggested that the “fair” rate of return for this type of 
investment should be a rate that generates sufficient revenue to cover operating costs and 
additionally provides a “fair” rate that allows the recapture of the invested capital for the 
investors.  Below this threshold, no private company will want to enter the investment, 
whereas above this one can assume the presence of an unfair situation. Hence, the payments 
to a private firm that perform public utilities might provide them a rate of return adequate in 
these terms.  
2.2. Excessive returns assessment 
In this subsection, we discuss in detail the different approaches to calculate excessive returns. 
It is worth mentioning that this is not a consensual matter in the literature. It is extremely hard 
to find a clear definition of excessive returns and the different profitability measures existent 
are quite controversial. As stated by Basil L. Copeland, Jr.:“you can now always find an 
economist somewhere who will testify that the fair return is some figure rather than another” 
(Copeland 1978: 348). Most of the literature dedicated to this theme was interested in 
measuring excessive returns associated to monopolistic behaviour. In UK, for example, many 
studies for the Competition Commission (CC) or the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) are indeed 
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based on profitability analysis. The methodology described in one of this studies8 for the OFT 
relies on the financial theory of firm valuation and might be applied to other analysis, like our 
study of PPPs. The idea of the study is to compare accurate profitability measures of a certain 
company with a suitable benchmark measure, so that if the profitability is “significantly” above 
the benchmark, there is indication of excessive returns.  
a. Profitability Measures 
In terms of profitability measures, the main debate in the literature has been centred on 
question of whether or not accounting data is suitable to be used as proper information of 
profitability. Authors as Fisher and McGowan (1983) argued that accounting rates of return are 
of totally misuse, whereas Kay (1976) followed by Edwards et al. (1987), cited in Stark (1989) 
proposed a close relationship between accounting and economic rates of return. Looking at 
the economic theory, we conclude that the rate of return should be the discount rate that 
equalizes to zero the discounted future cash-flows of a firm – the so called net present value 
(NPV). The rate of return that satisfies this condition is known as the economic rate of return 
or the internal rate of return (IRR). This rate corresponds to a hypothetical situation in which 
the firm is operating in a “perfectly competitive” market, thus gaining a “competitive profit” – 
zero.  Fisher and McGowan (1983: 82) described it as the rate of return that is “equalized 
everywhere in a competitive economy in long-run equilibrium”.  
The IRR per se does not provide clear information about profitability. To obtain this 
information, it should be compared against the respective cost of capital, which is the rate 
used to discount future cash-flows and obtain the NPV. Thus if the cost of capital is smaller 
than the IRR, the NPV is higher than zero. The figure below shows graphically the relation 
between the three measures. 
Figure 1 – Relation between NPV, IRR and Cost of Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8
 Relevant Study: OXERA, 2003. Assessing profitability in competition policy analysis, OFT Economic Discussion Paper 
6, July.  
Source – Authors 
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Although known as the more accurate measure of profitability, some conceptual problems 
have been associated to the IRR. One of the main concerns is the uncertainty related to future 
cash-flows used to obtain the IRR. In fact, both future costs and revenues depend on 
estimations for demand and prices which, in the long-run, are likely to be affected by 
unexpected shocks. In order to limit the impact of this issue, the solution suggested by Grout 
and Zalewska (2008) is to bind the time horizon for the calculation of the IRR, i.e. instead of 
using the lifetime of the project, to use a limited timeframe that corresponds to the period we 
want to analyse. The IRR calculated in this way is called the “Truncated” IRR (TIRR).  Another 
question rose by Grout and Zalewska (2008) concerning the IRR is its sensibility to the pattern 
of cash-flows. For example, if a huge amount of costs are paid at the end of the project (closing 
costs) one could end up having two IRRs for the same project. In such cases, the comparison 
against the cost of capital becomes ambiguous as it is not possible to know for sure what the 
right IRR is. It may also happen that, only due to a different structure of cash-flows (related to 
outsourcing agreements, rentals processes, etc.) two projects with the same NPV and same 
cost of capital present different IRRs. Likewise, we might have a project that, when modified 
on one of its parameters, result in smaller NPV but higher IRR comparing with the previous 
situation. Once again, the interpretation of (excessive) profitability in these cases becomes 
quite difficult.  
On account of these problems, authors like Edwards et al. (1987) cited in Stark (1989) argued 
that the IRR is not an appropriate measure to evaluate profitability of projects or firms as it 
may provide information conflicting with the information given by NPV. Nonetheless, the IRR is 
largely considered a reliable and consistent approach to calculate profitability if we bear in 
mind the situations with higher risk of misleading conclusions. In order to control for possible 
complications, when a profitability analysis is provided for projects that employ financial 
arrangements affecting the cash-flows' profile, one has to test for the IRR simulating situations 
where these processes are not in place. Thus it is possible to extract better information and to 
verify whether a high IRR is obtained by the cash-flows structure or by a possible unfair 
situation (market power, subsidization, etc.). Moreover, in parallel of the IRR it is important to 
use the information provided by the NPV and, if any, to assess for the origin of inconsistencies. 
In addition to the Economic Rate of Return, one can consider the Accounting Rate of Return 
(ARR) as measure of profitability. The ARR is a book measure of profitability widely used, 
corresponding to the ratio of the reported profits of a certain period (Earnings before Interest 
and Taxes – EBIT) on the total assets at the beginning of the period. The ARR bears the 
advantage of being quite easy to understand and to obtain, as both EBIT and total Assets are 
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reported each year (at least) by firms. However, its use as a reliable measure of economic 
profitability has been often contested. Fisher and McGowan (1983) are authors who criticize 
the use of the ARR as an accurate profitability measure. They argue that accounting returns 
are not in fact economic returns as they fail in accounting for some capitalizations as “research 
and development” (Fisher and McGowan, 1983: 82) and, going further, that “accounting rates 
of return, even if properly and consistently measured, provide almost no information about 
economic rates of return”. Considering this, they claim that having an ARR above the cost of 
capital does not mean necessarily that we are facing a positive NPV, as it is the case with the 
IRR. The reasons behind this idea are essentially related to the ARR’s sensitivity to conventions 
used to calculate either the numerator (the EBIT) or the denominator (Total Assets). The fact 
that both depend much on, for example, the methodology used to calculate depreciations and 
assets value (could be historic value, replacement cost, deprival value, etc.) represents a 
failure of consistency of the ARR in providing reliable information about economic profits.  
In spite of this, some authors argue in favour of the ARR as a suitable profitability measure. 
Actually, J. A. Kay (1976) proved that when the ARR is calculated using the deprival value of the 
assets (the value of the firm if it is deprived of its assets) the present value of assets is greater 
than the replacement cost (positive NPV), providing that the ARR is larger than the cost of 
capital. This fact indicates a close relationship between IRR and ARR, since their link to the NPV 
and cost of capital is the same providing that both are computed using the deprival value of 
assets. As the ARR will normally not be constant, whereas the IRR is, we know that the ARR 
and the IRR will not be equal, even calculated in this suitable way. However, J. A. Kay (1976) 
proposes that IRR is a weighted average of the ARRs through time, so that the ARR, with some 
cautions, can actually be used as a reliable measure of profitability. 
Likewise the ARR, the Return on Equity (ROE) is a broadly used measure which captures the 
profitability of the project under the equity owners’ point of view. It is also an accounting 
measure as it is the ratio of the Net Income of a period to the Equity at the beginning of this 
period. The questions before addressed to compute the EBIT for the ARR are also present in 
this case, to compute the Net Income, and therefore when the IRR or ARR are difficult to 
obtain, the ROE can also bear inaccuracy. Thus the ROE should only be seen as a 
complementary measure which provides information on equity owners’ profitability, when 
good accounting information is provided. Finally, when assets are difficult to assess, the Return 
on Sales or Turnover has been refer as a possible alternative. It is defined as the ratio of EBIT 
on the sales of the period. However this measure is considered by several authors as being 
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quite far from theoretical principle of economic rate of return and therefore  is only used as 
complement or in extreme cases where no other information is available. 
b. Benchmarks 
In order to assess for excessive returns when the profitability measures described above are 
available, one has to compare them against a suitable benchmark. The benchmark represents 
the value of what should be the expected return of a specific project. It is also known as the 
opportunity cost. The cost of capital is the most commonly used. It is the minimum required 
return that investors can entail from the level of risk they are taking. In other words, it is the 
level of return that makes investors indifferent between entering the project and placing their 
money in the bank at a risk-free rate. Although some debate around its use to valuate public 
utilities, authors as Copeland (1978) defends the appropriation of cost of capital as standard 
fair return. This fair return is different, for the same project, depending on the type of 
investors – equity or debt owner – namely because debt and equity are different in terms of 
seniority. Hence the cost of capital of a firm is actually a weighted cost of capital (WACC) of the 
cost of debt (  ) and cost of equity (  ). Thus, the WACC usually also takes into account the 
tax shields provided by the use of debt and its consequent payment of interests.  
The main question at this point is how to obtain this cost of capital, i.e. how to get the values 
for    and   . The cost of debt will not be discussed in much detail, as this one is usually 
relatively easy to obtain, by adding up a default spread to the risk free rate. The default spread 
is provided by agency rates or estimated and negotiated by the own bank (or another agent) 
that will borrow capital to the firm. On the other hand, the cost of equity comprises some 
complexities that have to be described in more detail (not exhaustively). 
 The most widely known method to obtain the cost of equity is the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). The theoretical basis of this model developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965a, b), 
is the idea that equity investors are able to fully diversify their portfolio of assets. Thereby they 
are only exposed to the un-diversifiable risk – the market risk – and the expected risk premium 
of a certain investment only depends on its degree of systematic risk i.e. the risk of the asset 
relative to the market risk9. The discussion around the validity of the CAPM, although broadly 
investigated, will not be addressed in this work for lack of pertinence. However, in what 
concerns using this measure to compute the cost of equity for PPPs projects, although CAPM 
                                                     
9
 CAPM Model:                    
Where:    – risk free rate  
            – expected market risk premium 
    – Levered degree of Systematic risk  
12 
 
remains a useful tool, it is worth considering some drawbacks, pointed out by Grout and 
Zalewska (2008). One of the most relevant is the fact that the cost of capital computed using 
CAPM is a measure derived from the stock market, which does not apply to our projects. 
Actually, PPPs are investments in physical assets and not in financial ones, and physical assets’ 
investors are, sometimes, less likely to be well diversified than the investors in market shares. 
So the basic assumption behind CAPM might not hold in some cases. Moreover, as most of the 
companies that operate PPPs are not public companies, it is not possible to estimate the 
degree of systematic risk for such companies10. Therefore we have to use a comparable listed 
company, which could be difficult to find out as the PPPs’ line of business is usually not present 
in the stock market (due to its specific risk structure).  
In acknowledge of the problems related to the cost of capital, an alternative manner of 
benchmarking the profitability often applied in profitability analysis is the use of returns 
observed in comparable firms or industries. The advantage of this methodology is that it allows 
capturing the economic cycles and how they are affecting the industry returns. Copeland 
(1978) has provided a discussion of the differences between using cost of capital or 
comparable earnings for valuation of public utilities’ fair return. Copeland defends that 
although theoretically measuring comparable firms’ earnings indeed represent the opportunity 
cost of capital (assuming that investors are able to invest in comparable investment 
opportunities) this measure “violates a marginal condition necessary to achieve efficiency in 
the allocation of capital” (Copeland, 1978: 350) in public utilities. This because when seeking 
for a fair return in public utilities, one is implicitly defending that these public utilities should 
provide the returns observed in unregulated competitive markets. However Copeland (1978) 
argued that using the average returns of comparable firms does not provide the information 
about the marginal return that a new firm entering the market would earn, which is the 
accurate return to seek for. Furthermore, the choice of the most appropriate comparators is a 
tough task. The most difficult is to be sure that the comparator used has the same cost 
structure, and faces the same risks. Actually, when analysing PPPs it could turn out to be quasi 
impossible to find a suitable comparator as the specificity of risk-sharing with the public sector 
is not found in other industries. The alternative, in this case, could be to use an international 
firm also operating as PPP, but then we can lose the advantage of capturing economic cycles of 
                                                     
10
 Estimation of β by regressing:          
Where   - Excess return of the stock j 
  - Market excess return 
  and  - Parameters to estimate 
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a specific country. Additionally, according to Copeland (1978) using as benchmark comparable 
firms’ returns instead of the cost of capital gives usually a higher estimation of fair return. 
Therefore, the use of this methodology in PPPs’ studies should be undertaken with reasonable 
cautions and never applied as unique solution, but as complement to other ones. 
c. How to assess for excessive returns? 
In addition to the conceptual problems that we have addressed concerning both profitability 
and benchmark measures, the comparison between both in order to assess for excessive 
returns is not straightforward as well. The first question which has to be considered is that, 
when we talk about "fair" return – the return that a firm should provide given its level of risk 
(the benchmark) – the truth is that we are speaking about a return only obtained under the 
assumption of perfect competition. The criteria to define a “perfectly competitive” market are 
the following: 
 Large number of buyers and sellers 
 Homogenous product 
 Perfect information about the product, prices and market conditions 
 Free allocation of resources 
 No barriers to entry and exit 
 No restrictions on capital markets  
Thus, the closer we are to these conditions in the real markets the closer should the 
profitability measure (for example IRR) be to the cost of capital. However, one can easily verify 
that such conditions are very difficult to be met in the real world. Besides, actual firms usually 
have different performances, which also affect their profitability. For these reasons, most of 
the literature (for example Grout and Zalewska, 2008) defends that having returns above the 
fair return is perfectly usual, and often they are only a result either of higher performance or 
of the non-existence of perfectly competitive market. Consequently, the profits observed in 
real economies will usually not be the economic ones – zero – but reasonably positive ones. 
This is the situation where there is what is called "excess" returns, even in well-functioning 
markets.  
The question is to know when these "excess" returns become large enough to be considered 
"excessive", indicating unfair situations. Defining in a broad sense, one can assume that 
excessive returns exist when the profitability of a firm is substantially and consistently above 
the cost of capital for a reasonable period of time. Nonetheless, the perfect distinction 
between "excess" and "excessive" returns remains indeterminate. Lacking of a theoretical 
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basis, a possible alternative to solve this question is to use empirical evidence. The UK 
Competition Commission, for example, uses data on firms’ returns where it has been proven 
the existence of an unfair condition in order to measure how much the profitability was 
pushed up in such cases. Hence, data provided by Grout and Zalewska (2008) comparing 
companies where irregular situations were found and others where there were not, show that 
differences in ARRs are about 20%. In cases where these irregular situations were linked to 
monopolistic abuses, the difference on ARRs reaches 70%. Thus one can see that empirical 
evidence points towards significant differences in ARRs for these to be considered "excessive". 
The main lesson to take from the general literature on profitability analysis is that it is very 
difficult to set up general rules that fit all cases. In practical situations, the important is to have 
a clear knowledge of the situation we are analysing and to use more than one measure and 
methodology, in order to prevent misleading measurement and analysis.   
 
III. Methodology 
3.1. Portuguese SCUTs Background 
Since the beginnings of the 2000s until 2010, there were in Portugal seven roads concessions 
functioning under The Shadow Toll Road model of PPPs (SCUTs). This model consisted in a 
system where roads were available to users freely. Compensation to concessioners was paid 
by the state according to the actual traffic, through a scheme of ranges that establishes 
different prices for each range of traffic. In principle, the minimum threshold was low enough 
to guarantee the concessioner to always receive a minimum compensation for the operation. 
In 2007, the Portuguese Government decided to change the management and financing model 
of the road infrastructure sector and initiated a process of introduction of real tolls in the 
SCUTs to happen in 2010. This led to the implementation of a new model of compensation 
that we call the availability revenue system. It consists of a scheme where the tolls’ revenue 
collected by the concessioner is totally delivered to the state (or, in this case, to “Estradas de 
Portugal”, a state-owned enterprise). On the other hand, the state commits to pay the 
concessioner revenue for the road availability and for the tolls’ collection service. The 
obligations of the concessioner are to maintain roads available at any moment (temporary 
unavailability due to accidents, maintenance works, etc. can be deducted from the payment) 
and to supply the tolls’ charge service. The payment for the tolls’ charge service is intended to 
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compensate for the initial fixed investment on the tolls’ porticoes and also for the operation 
and maintenance variable costs (O&M) of this service (which depend on the number of 
transactions). Other O&M costs with the roads are also intended to be covered by the 
payments from the state. The following figures illustrate the mechanism of this model. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the main features of this new mechanism is the fact that all the demand risk is now 
allocated to the public sector. In fact, as seen in figure 2, if the tolls revenue falls below the 
fixed “availability” payment, the government has a loss as it receives less than what it has to 
pay. The demand risk is thus transferred from the private to the public side. On the other 
hand, it is now possible for the state to actually have a gain with the SCUTs operation (figure 3 
case) whereas with the previous model the state was paying the concessioner the 
compensation without ever collecting any revenue.  
Nevertheless, it is expected that the situation of the tolls revenue being larger than the 
“availability” payment will only happen in the long-run. The reasons for these are, firstly, that 
in the short-run the country is facing a tough economic conjuncture that is likely to reduce the 
traffic in the ex-SCUTs and therefore lower the tolls’ revenue. Secondly, the fact that the 
availability payments planned to be made by the state are much higher in the early years than 
in the final years of the concessions (see appendix B – figure 1 for the evolution of payments 
Figure 2 – Payment Model when tolls revenue 
are lower than fixed “availability” revenue 
Figure 3 – Payment Model when tolls revenue 
are higher than fixed “availability” revenue 
Source – Authors 
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until 2031). Therefore it is unexpected that the state will be able to have gains in the next 
years. 
The introduction of real tolls in the SCUTs started in October 2010 (with Costa de Prata, 
Grande Porto and Norte Litoral) and was finalized in December 2011 with the remainder 
concessions. However, now that all the negotiations around the new model of compensation 
are concluded, concerns about the amounts to be paid as availability revenue are raised. In 
order to meet targets defined in the Memorandum of Understanding, the current agreements 
are under the possibility of suffering some changes that can reduce the weight of obligations 
the government had committed to pay. The main question that we attempt to answer is 
whether or not the payments agreed are in fact “excessive” and, if so, whether there is 
opportunity to renegotiate them without harming both the (financial) performance of the 
concession and its capability to pay the debt contracted. 
3.2. Profitability measures and benchmarks used 
 
a. Profitability Measures 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (IRR) and NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) 
Following the related literature let us first look at the data we have available to perform our 
profitability analysis, as well as at the type of firm we are studying. Related to the firm’s type, 
we notice that the road sector is an established industry, which provides a traditional product 
or service, with well-known accounting rules. Moreover, these are firms with few intangible 
assets, therefore with less problems of assets valuation. In terms of data, we have historical 
data over seven years, for all the firms, in the same life cycle – the beginning of operation.  
Thus we choose to compute the Internal Rate of Return as main measure of profitability, 
according to: 
          ∑
        
        
  
 
   
 (1) 
 
Where:       – Revenue for the period t minus any outflow (investments or costs) for the 
same period with exception of costs with the debt service, calculated as follows: 
 
 
                                                           
                         
(2) 
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Where:                   – Any depreciation, amortization or provision of the period. 
   – The tax rate 
        – The investment in fixed assets 
                         – The investment in net working capital, defined as Current 
Assetst – Current Liabilitiest 
We complete the information given by the IRR with the calculation of the Net Present Value: 
     ∑
        
                    
 
   
 (3) 
 
TRUNCATED INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (TIRR)  
For our historical profitability assessment, the IRR computed is slightly different as it is an IRR 
for a limited period of time. This is called the Truncated IRR (TIRR) already mentioned in the 
literature review and obtained by: 
    ∑
     
         
 
  
         
 
   
 (4) 
Where:    – Initial Assets Value 
    – Assets Value at the end of the chosen period 
 
RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE) 
Another measure of profitability also used in this work is the return on equity, as a 
complement to the evidence provided by the IRR or TIRR and for the purpose of obtaining 
information about the equity owners’ profitability with the projects. It is calculated as: 
     ∑
              
                          
 
   
 (5) 
b. Benchmarks 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL (WACC) 
As main benchmark against the IRR we use the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Like 
seen in Section 2.2., the extent at which the IRR exceeds the cost of capital gives us indication 
on how much will be the NPV greater than zero. The WACC post-tax is usually computed as: 
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   (6) 
 
 
 
 
It is important to mention that the WACC that should be used to compare against the IRR is at 
all times the ex-ante one, i.e. the WACC that was took into account when making the 
investment decision, and which is the actual rate of return the firm should be providing. In our 
SCUTs’ case, as we do not have data available to compute this WACC, we use the base case 
WACC (BC WACC) that corresponds to the agreements stipulated in the SCUTs contracts. To 
compare against the ROE, we use also the ex-ante cost of equity (Re) that is reported in the 
SCUTs’ contracts. 
INDUSTRY AND FIRM COMPARATORS 
Finally, we also seek to a comparable firm or industry in order to complete our approach. Our 
comparable industry is simulated by the average IRR and ROE amongst SCUTs. For the 
comparable firm we choose a similar company operating in the road sector in Portugal, BRISA, 
S.A for which we also estimate the IRR and the ROE.  
Following these steps, the profitability assessment is then conducted in two phases. The first is 
the assessment of each SCUT’s historical profitability, which corresponds to the period before 
the real tolls implementation. The second is focused on future profitability, based on the data 
of future payments, and has a forecasted nature. The next subsection describes the 
methodology used in each phase. 
3.3. Data & Excessive Returns Assessment 
 
a. Historical Profitability Assessment 
For the purpose of calculating historical TIRR and ROE we use data of the SCUTs collected from 
their respective annual reports. We provide this analysis for two assessment periods; one that 
is equal for all SCUTs and another that takes into account the fact that the concessions entered 
into operation in different years. Thus the first period is comprised between 2004 and 2010 for 
all SCUTs (except Norte Litoral, which due to lack of available data, is only assessed between 
Where: 𝐸 – Equity   
              𝐷 – Debt (before taxes) 
 𝑇 – Tax rate 
 𝑘𝑒 – Cost of Debt 
 𝑘𝑑  – Cost of Equity 
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2006 and 2010) and the second starts from the year of entrance into operation (different for 
each SCUT)11 and goes until 2010. The objective is always to capture how the SCUTs had 
performed before the renegotiations of 2010.  
In what concerns the profitability assessment of BRISA, S.A – the comparable firm – we use the 
period between 2001 and 2007, which coincides with the consolidation of the highways 
network of this firm and therefore is closer to the life cycle studied for the SCUTs. Data for 
BRISA was also extracted from its annual reports. 
All the elements used to estimate the profitability measures of both SCUTs and BRISA are 
actual values provided by their annual reports, except for the tax rate, that we considered to 
be 25% for all firms. 
In order to obtain the benchmarks to compare against the TIRR and ROE, we use the base case 
values of WACC and Re provided by the Court of Audits (Tribunal de Contas). These values are 
compiled from all the SCUTs contracts, where they were agreed between the parties. Table I 
describes in detail the base case of each SCUT.  
Table I – Data of the SCUTs Base Case 
The following table presents the data of each SCUT’s base case. All the values and information 
corresponds to the original agreements that were accorded between the parties in the original SCUTs 
contracts. Looking at the IRR estimations we observe that, in some cases, these are already well above 
the base case WACC. 
SCUTS 
Beira 
Interior 
Beiras 
Litoral e 
Alta 
Interior 
Norte 
Algarve 
Norte 
Litoral 
Costa de 
Prata 
Grande 
Porto 
Year 1999 2001 2000 2000 2001 2000 2002 
Capex (€ Thousands) 590 000 693 000 493 000 218 000 305 000 293 000 465 000 
Kilometers 178 155 129 105 72 176 115 
Capex/Km (€ Thousands) 3 315 3 181 1 690 2 790 6 458 3 938 2 652 
Debt (€ Thousands) 534 540 632 016 483 140 181 158 231 800 267 509 372 000 
Equity - % 9,4 8,8 2,0 16,9 24,0 8,7 20,0 
Equity (€ Thousands) 55 460 60 984 9 860 36 842 73 200 25 491 93 000 
Cost of Debt (Rd) - % 8,8 6,3 6,1 6,3 7,4 5,9 5,7 
Cost of Equity (Re) - % 13,0 13,1 13,2 7,7 6,4 11,9 12,2 
Tax - % 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 
WACC - % 7,2 5,5 4,7 5,2 5,8 5,1 5,9 
IRR - % 7,4 9,6 6,7 8,4 9,5 9,2 6,7 
Main Shareholders 
S.COSTA; 
T.DUARTE; 
DRAGADOS; 
ALVES 
RIBEIRO 
ASCENDI 
EIFAGGE; 
SONAE 
FERROVIAL FERROVIAL ASCENDI ASCENDI 
National (N)/ Foreign (F) N N F/N F F N N 
                                                     
11
 Beira Interior: 2005; Interior Norte: 2007; Algarve: 2004;  Costa de Prata: 2005; Grande Porto: 2007; Beiras litoral 
e altas: 2007; Norte Litoral: 2006. 
Source – Court of Audits, 2003 Report 
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After obtaining the TIRR and the ROE and comparing them against the respective benchmarks 
we need to define how to assess for excessive returns. As found in the literature, we know that 
the simple fact that the two compared values are different does not necessarily mean that we 
are in the presence of excessive returns. Hence the relative difference between the two pairs 
of measures is computed for the purpose of quantifying the excess level of the TIRR, if any. At 
this point we have to impose a certain threshold that might indeed give clear evidence of 
excessive returns. Following the numbers presented by Grout and Zalewska (2008), the 
criterion to consider indication of excessive returns used in this study is an excess of 20% of 
the TIRR on the base case WACC. We also choose this value accounting for the fact that the 
SCUTs are facing nowadays lower risk with the new payment system. Therefore, following the 
financial theory that returns should compensate for the risk, we assume that the SCUTs the 
TIRR should not exceed in more than 20% the base case WACC.  Additionally to the TIRR, we 
also compare the ROE and the base case Re and verify the consistency of the results with those 
obtained in the TIRR analysis.  
Furthermore we estimate the profitability of our chosen comparators. For this purpose we first 
match the results of the several SCUTs, ranking them in terms of TIRR and ROE. For each of 
these measures we then compute a weighted average among SCUTs and thus assess for the 
SCUTs that fall above or below the average. Finally, we compute the TIRR and ROE for the 
comparable firm – BRISA, S.A – and also rank them among the individual SCUTs and the 
respective weighted average. The following figure synthetizes our methodology:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Forecasted Profitability Assessment 
The forecasted profitability assessment is performed for the period between 2011 and the 
concession’s final year (which corresponds to 30 years after the beginning of the concession, 
see table I). For this period, which is under the scope of the new payment system (availability 
Figure 4 – Historical Profitability Assessment Methodology 
Source – Authors 
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revenue) we build a scenario for cash flows estimates, in order to further compute the IRR, 
NPV and ROE.  
In our analysis, revenues are the unique non-forecasted indicator, as we assume that they 
correspond to the fixed payments to be delivered by the state. The data on these payments is 
available in the 2010 PPPs report of the GASEPC - Gabinete de Acompanhamento do Sector 
Empresarial do Estado, Parcerias e Concessões, and are detailed in appendix A – Table II.  
For the remaining items of the FCFF calculation (see section 3.2.a.), we need to set 
assumptions based on historical data, business knowledge and macroeconomic information. 
Having the revenues, the additional elements we ought to forecast are the annual O&M costs, 
the depreciations, the CAPEX in big repairs, the investment in net working capital, the interests 
and debt amortization and the tax rate. Table II describes carefully all the assumptions used to 
forecast the annual FCFF. 
Table II – Assumptions used to estimate the future SCUTs cash flows 
 
Item Assumption 
Revenue Availability payments from the State according to latest agreements 
Starting point of O&M costs 
Last four years average (2007 – 2010) – corresponds to the consolidation 
of operation 
O&M costs Growth Rate Increasing 3% per year – assumed future inflation 
CAPEX in Big Repairs 10% of the Initial Capex every ten years since 2003 (2013 and 2023) 
Investment in  Net Working 
Capital 
According to the rules regarding the new payment mechanism:  
 State payments – accounts receivable. Assuming quarterly 
payments 
 Tolls revenue delivery – accounts payable. Assuming monthly 
delivery 
Depreciation Constant, assets being totally depreciated at the end of the concession 
Amortization of Debt Constant, with 15 years of maturity from 2010 
Interests Constant – historical average cost of debt  of the period before 2011
12
 
Taxes 25% of tax rate when Earnings Before Taxes are positive, zero otherwise 
Equity Equity = Assets - Debt 
Source – Authors 
Table II is aimed at acknowledging all the assumptions taken for our forecast of future FCFFs. 
The item we call “starting point of O&M costs” is the assumption we use to forecast the 2011 
(the first year of FCFF estimation) value of costs. We choose to use the last four years average 
(2007 – 2010) and to actualize it at the expected inflation (3%). For the years following we 
                                                     
12
 The period of calculation of the Average Cost of Capital starts when interests began being paid for 
each SCUT. This period differ among SCUTs.  
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assume always annual growth rate of 3%, assuming that the inflation will remain at this 
constant level. We assume for the CAPEX in big repairs that it is 10% of the initial CAPEX in two 
points in time: 2013 and 2023. For all the remaining years, this item is equal to zero. For the 
investment in net working capital (NWC), we follow the rules explained in the annual reports 
of the concession that, in 2010, was already under the availability payment mechanism (Costa 
de Prata, Grande Porto and Norte Litoral). These rules specify that the payments the State is 
committed to provide to the SCUTs are registered in the balance sheet as accounts receivable, 
in the rubric of current assets (CA). On the other hand, the tolls revenue that the SCUTs are 
obliged to deliver to the State are registered as accounts payable, in the rubric of current 
liabilities (CL). Knowing that the NWC is equal to CA – CL, we assume that the CA are only the 
accounts receivable corresponding to the payments from the State and that these payments 
are made quarterly. For the CL, we assume they are composed the accounts payable 
corresponding to the tolls’ revenue13, which are delivered monthly (assuming a conservative 
perspective) plus the value due to suppliers, who are paid quarterly. Concerning the debt, the 
maturity assumed leads this one to be zero from 2025 onwards. 
Having constructed the forecasted balance sheet that allows obtaining the annual FCFF, it is 
then possible to compute each SCUT’s IRR, NPV and ROE for the period that we are analysing. 
At this point, the methodology becomes similar to that of the historical assessment. It consists 
of opposing the obtained results with the benchmarks already used in the previous assessment 
(see figure 4). Having both the historical and the forecasted assessments completed we also 
look at differences between the results obtained in each one, in order to capture the effect of 
the new payment system’s introduction. Due to lack of suitable information about future 
revenues for BRISA, S.A, we do not use it as benchmark in the forecasted assessment. 
c. Renegotiation scenarios 
After concluding about evidence on the existence of excessive returns within the forecasted 
period (after 2010), the results obtained are then used to study a possible scenario of 
renegotiation. As we decide to accept evidence about excessive returns whenever the IRR is 
greater than 120% of the base case WACC, we thus use this condition for our renegotiation 
scenario. Hence, uniquely for the SCUTs that have shown evidence of excessive returns, we 
impose a decrease on the annual revenues paid by the state that adjusts the IRR to the “fair” 
level here considered. The reduction proposed is defined as a percentage discount, equally 
                                                     
13
 The expected values of tolls’revenue between 2011 and 2032 were extracted from According to GASEPC – 
Gabinete de Acompanhamento do Sector Empresarial do Estado, Parcerias e Concessões, 2011. Parcerias Público 
Privadas e concessões Relatório 2011, Lisbon 
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applied to each year payment. Thereby, in absolute terms each year has a different discount, 
having the higher payments a higher absolute reduction than the lower payments. Therefore 
the shape of payments is smoothed by this scenario of renegotiation. Once applied the 
respective deduction on payments, we study, for each SCUT individually, the impacts of the 
renegotiation on: 
1- The Present Value of state payments 
2- The profitability measures – IRR, NPV, WACC and ROE of the period 
3- The Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) 
In order to take into account the fact that a significant decrease in the DSCR can be an 
important barrier to the concretization of the renegotiations proposed, we study a second 
scenario of renegotiation. Hence for the renegotiations that, in the first scenario, led the DSCR 
to a value lower than 1,1 – which we assume as “security threshold” – we study a 
renegotiation that brings the IRR to the lowest possible value having the DSCR restricted at the 
minimum of 1,1. Then we compare the impacts of this renegotiation on all the variables before 
defined against the results of the previous scenario. 
Finally, we look at the impacts of the all the SCUTs renegotiations proposed as a whole (in the 
two scenarios), both in terms of present value of all the SCUTs payments and in terms of 
annual reduction for the period between 2012 and 2018. 
 
IV. Results 
In this section the results and main findings of the profitability assessment are presented. They 
reflect the application of the methodology presented above both for the historical and 
forecasted profitability assessment. We also present the results of our renegotiation strategy 
in terms of the main agents’ outcome. 
4.1. Historical Profitability Assessment 
We start presenting the results of the historical assessment, for two periods of estimation; one 
going from 2004 to 2010 for all SCUTs, and the other going from their entrance into 
operation’s year (which differs among them) to 2010. Table III presents the results of the TIRR 
estimations for each SCUT against several benchmarks; base case WACC, average SCUTs’ TIRR 
and BRISA’s TIRR.  
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Table III 
Truncated Internal Rate of Return estimations from the Historical Assessment Profitability, (%) 
This table provides the results of the historical TIRR estimations. We obtain these results by finding the rate of 
return that, discounting the annual FCFFs for the period under analysis, would equalize the value of opening assets 
to that of the closing assets. * The period of estimation of BRISA, S.A: 2001 – 2007 ** N – national; F – Foreign; F/N 
– both foreign and national. n.a. – not applicable 
 TIRR 
Entrance into 
operation
14
 
until 2010 
TIRR  
2004 – 2010
15
 
Base case 
WACC  
N/F** 
BRISA, S.A.* 10,6 10,6 n.a. n.a. 
Beira Interior 8,0 7,9 7,2 N 
Costa de Prata 7,8 3,6 5,1 N 
Beiras Litoral e Alta 6,9 13,8 5,5 N 
Grande Porto 6,1 4,8 5,9 N 
Algarve 5,5 5,5 5,2 F 
SCUTs Average
16
 4,3 5,3 5,7 n.a. 
Norte Litoral 1,6 1,6 5,8 F 
Interior Norte -4,9 -3,3 4,7 F/N 
Source – Authors 
While looking at the results, it is possible to notice substantial differences among the 
performances of the SCUTs. Considering the period between 2004 and 2010, it is possible to 
see that the different timings of entrance into operation affected the profitability of these 
projects in the period between 2004 and 2010. Through the analysis of the SCUTs’ balance 
sheets we observe that the early years of this period provided for the generality negative net 
incomes. Costa de Prata’s TIRR, for example, is clearly being negatively affected by the 
timeframe of estimation since 2003 and 2004 were still years of construction. On the other 
hand, Beiras Litoral e Alta is being privileged as it presents a substantial variance between its 
opening and closing assets value for the period chosen, which enhance the value of the TIRR 
(see equation 4). This occurs because this concession only entered into operation in 2007 
hence its assets’ value in the beginning of 2004 was relatively low. 
Looking at the period between the entrance into operation and 2010 we observe that the 
results among SCUTs are more consistent. We see also that Beira Interior, which is the largest 
SCUT in kilometres, shows the best performance (in absolute terms). Its size, which allows for 
the existence of economies of scale, and the fact that this concession was among the first 
entering into operation affected positively its performance.  
                                                     
14
 Beira Interior: 2005; Interior Norte: 2007; Algarve: 2004;  Costa de Prata: 2005; Grande Porto: 2007; Beiras litoral 
e altas: 2007; Norte Litoral: 2006.  
15
 Except for Interior Norte whose period of analysis is 2005 – 2010 
16
 Assets Weighted Average  
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Costa de Prata is another concession showing high results. Even considering the fact that this 
concession has also entered into operation relatively soon, its results may look unexpected, 
partly because it is a relatively small concession. When comparing with Algarve, that is similar 
to Costa de Prata (see table I) and started its operation even sooner, we see that this one 
obtained comparatively low results. Looking at the balance sheets of these two concessions for 
this period one can indeed observe values of net income much lower for Algarve than for 
Costa de Prata, which explains the differences in profitability. The higher net income of Costa 
de Prata in comparison with Algarve cannot, however, be related neither to higher operational 
revenues nor to lower operational costs. The main difference seems provide from the financial 
results, which, until 2010, contained the payments made by the state. Looking at the shape of 
these payments we see that the agreement with Costa de Prata stipulated high payments at 
the early years of the concession, while the payments to Algarve are ascending through time 
see appendix A – Table I). 
Interior Norte, contrarly to Costa de Prata, presents a lower performance showing a negative 
TIRR, which is even reinforced when we look only at the period after the starting of operation. 
The profitability of this concession at its early years was affected by delays in the road 
construction, which led to negative results until 2008. Indeed in 2008 Interior Norte was even 
forced to intend with the Portuguese government the necessity of a financial rebalance. Other 
SCUTs that faced delays on construction, as Norte Litoral, also saw their profitability affected 
and requested financial rebalances.  
When looking at the comparisons against the SCUTs average and BRISA, S.A we verify that only 
Norte Litoral and Interior Norte are below the average when considering the timeframe from 
the entrance into operation until 2010. However, within this period we observe that any SCUT 
performed better in terms of TIRR than their main comparator, BRISA, S.A. 
Figure 5 completes the information of Table III by providing the results of the ratio of TIRR on 
the base case WACC for each SCUT. For this purpose we use the estimation for the period 
between the entrance into operation and 2010. We also show in the figure the threshold that 
indicates evidence of excessive returns (TIRR 20% above the BC WACC). We conclude that the 
two concessions showing evidence on the existence of excessive returns are Costa de Prata 
and Beiras Litoral e Alta. The former presents a relative difference between TIRR and base case 
WACC of around 53% whereas the latter presents a ratio of 27%. Other concessions obtain 
values of TIRR above the base case WACC, but this difference does not attain 20%. The weak 
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53,2 
26,5 
11,1 5,6 4,5 
-71,7 
-202,9 
20 
Costa de
Prata
Beiras
Litoral e
Alta
Beira
Interior
Algarve Grande
Porto
Norte
Litoral
Interior
Norte
Ratio
TIRR/WACC -1
Excessive
Returns
Treshold
performance revealed by Norte litoral and Interior Norte is confirmed by the comparison 
against their respective benchmarks. 
Figure 5 – Comparison of historical TIRR against Base Case WACC 
Entrance into operation
17
 until 2010, (%)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the methodology, historical ROE is also estimated for the purpose of capturing the 
equity profitability of the SCUTs. The results are presented in table IV and in figure 7 below. 
The conclusions that we are able to infer from the ROE analysis are in line with the information 
provided by both the TIRR and the NPV.  
 
Table IV – Return on Equity estimations from the Historical Assessment Profitability, (%) 
This table provides the results of the historical ROE estimations. As the ROE is a non-constant measure calculated 
annually, the results presented in the table are those of the weighted average return on equity of the respective 
period for each SCUT. This weighted average is calculated for each firm as:  
∑      
∑           
, where t is the first year of the 
period considered and T the last year.  * The period of estimation of BRISA, S.A: 2001 – 2007 ** N – national; F – 
Foreign; F/N – both foreign and national. n.a. – not applicable 
  
                                                     
17,18
 Beira Interior: 2005; Interior Norte: 2007; Algarve: 2004;  Costa de Prata: 2005; Grande Porto: 2007; Beiras 
litoral e altas: 2007; Norte Litoral: 2006.    
19
 Except for Interior Norte whose period of analysis is 2005 – 2010 
20
 Equity Weighted Average 
 
ROE 
Entrance into 
operation
18
 – 2010 
ROE 
2004 – 2010
19
 
Base case 
Re 
ROE – Base 
case Re 
(p.p.) 
N/F** 
Costa de Prata 23,6 21,4 11,9 9,6 N 
Beira Interior 21,7 19,5 13,0 6,5 N 
BRISA, S.A.* 15,1 15,1 n.a n.a n.a 
SCUTs Average
20
 12,5 11,1 10,7 0,4 n.a 
Beiras Litoral e Alta  15,8 13,2 13,1 0,1 N 
Algarve 7,9 7,9 7,7 0,2 F 
Grande Porto 10,2 8,7 12,2 -3,5 N 
Norte Litoral 3,2 3,2 6,4 -3,3 F 
Interior Norte 0,1 0,1 13,2 -13,1 F/N 
Source - Authors 
Source - Authors 
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Figure 7 - Comparison of historical ROE against Base Case Re 
Entrance into operation
21
 until 2010, (%)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
We see in table IV that Costa de Prata continue to confirm evidence of excessive returns, being 
well above the average ROE and even above BRISA’s ROE, in the two periods of analysis. We 
also obtain a value of ROE for Beira Interior that is clearly outperforming the base case Re, 
while Beiras Litoral e Alta presents a value more in line with its base case. It is also to notice 
that the weak performance of Interior Norte is even more evident when analysing the ROE. In 
fact, this SCUT presents the higher value of base case Re among all the others. Nevertheless, as 
seen in figure 7, the return for equity investors verified until 2010 falls quite below the 
expected return.  
 
Main findings 
The historical profitability assessment concludes some remarks about the financial 
performance of the SCUTs for the period before the introduction of the new payment 
mechanism. Thus we are able to verify that Costa de Prata is the concession showing stronger 
evidence on excessive returns, as the analysis of both the TIRR and ROE demonstrate 
outperformance of its base case. Costa de Prata profitability measures do not outperform the 
benchmark only for BRISA, S.A, which can have several explanations. Not only BRISA’s road 
network is considerably higher than Costa de Prata, as also benefits from providing the 
connection between Lisbon and Oporto. Moreover, BRISA, S.A is a much mature firm than 
Costa de Prata. The concessions Beira Interior and Beiras Litoral e Alta also demonstrate some 
evidence on excessive returns as they are outperforming their base case measures in terms of 
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ROE and TIRR, respectively. Besides, they are both above BRISA, S.A in terms of ROE. On the 
other hand, two concessions – Norte Litoral and Interior Norte – are clearly revealing a lower 
financial performance within the timeframe under analysis.  
 
4.2. Forecasted Profitability Assessment 
Similarly to the historical assessment, in this subsection we provide the results obtained in the 
forecasted assessment for the IRR, NPV and the ROE, complementing with the NPV. The 
estimations of IRR are provided in Table V. When looking at the table one can see that the 
divergences of profitability among SCUTs that were already observed in the historical 
assessment remain visible. However, the SCUTs that demonstrated before poor performances 
are now exhibiting substantially improved results. This is the case of Algarve and Norte Litoral, 
which obtain IRRs above their benchmarks. It also to notice that Interior Norte, whose 
historical profitability was always below its benchmarks, is now presenting the best 
performance amongst SCUTs. On the opposite, one can see a complete reversion of the Costa 
de Prata concession’s situation whose estimation is the worst among the others SCUTs. 
Table V - Internal rate of return estimations from the forecasted assessment profitability (%) 
This table provides the results of the forecasted IRR estimations. We obtain these results by finding the rate of 
return that, discounting the annual FCFFs for the period under analysis, would provide a net present value of zero.  
* Assets weighted average. ** N – national; F – Foreign; F/N – both foreign and national. n.a. – not applicable 
 
 Forecasted IRR 
2011 until end of 
concession
22
 
Base Case 
WACC 
N/F** 
Interior Norte 12,5 4,7 F/N 
Algarve 10,8 5,2 F 
Norte Litoral 9,3 5,7 F 
SCUTs average*
 
7,5 5,7 n.a. 
Beiras Litoral e Alta 7,2 5,5 N 
Grande Porto 7,0 5,9 N 
Beira Interior 4,8 7,2 N 
Costa de Prata 3,1 5,1 N 
Source – Authors 
The change on the forecasted situation when compared to the historical can be related with 
the changes in the payments agreements that occurred in 2010. In appendix A – Table III we 
show that these changes in general benefit the concessions that obtain high performance in 
our estimations, mainly in the next years. Interior Norte, for example, is the most benefited in 
2011 (although not in present value). Furthermore, it is worth looking at the pattern of costs 
that the concessions were revealing before 2011 in order to understand the results obtained. 
                                                     
22
 Beira Interior: 2029; Interior Norte/Algarve/Costa de Prata: 2030; Grande Porto/Beiras litoral e alta/Norte Litoral: 
2031 
29 
 
In table VI we present the average O&M per kilometre for each SCUT calculated for the period 
between 2007 and 2010 (four years before our analysis). 
Table VI – Comparison between the Average O&M costs/km and the IRR estimations  
This table provides information of the SCUTs’ pasts costs and relates it with our IRR estimations. The O&M costs/km 
is thus calculated for the period between 2007 and 2010, which corresponds to the period in which all the SCUTs 
are already operating. The IRR is calculated for the period between 2011 and the end of concession
23
.  
 
 
Pasts O&M cots/Km 
(€ Thousands) 
Future IRR 
(%) 
Algarve 39,5 10,8 
Interior Norte 47,5 9,0 
Norte Litoral 55,8 8,5 
Beiras Litoral e Alta  57,2 8,8 
Grande Porto 95,0 4,5 
Beira Interior 102,0 4,5 
Costa de Prata 139,0 3,9 
Source - Authors 
It is interesting to see that, generally, lower costs per kilometre are leading to higher IRR. This 
is the result of one of our main assumptions that defines as starting point for the costs the 
average of the last four years (see Table II). Thereby we are assuming that the future pattern 
of costs for each SCUT is being affected by their past costs and that the SCUTs not able to be 
efficient in the past will maintain the same behaviour. Thus, when looking at table VI we 
conclude that one of the reasons for the poor forecasted performance of Costa de Prata and 
Beira Interior can be their inefficiency in terms of costs per kilometre in the past four years. On 
the other hand it is clear that Algarve, who has demonstrated superior cost efficiency in the 
past, benefit from this in our analysis. 
When analysing the comparison between the estimations of IRR against the base case WACC, 
we conclude that four concessions – Interior Norte, Algarve, Norte Litoral and Beiras Litoral e 
Alta – are showing evidence on excessive returns. This is possible to observe in Figure 8, which 
shows the results of the ratio of the IRR estimations on the Base Case WACC, when comparing 
with the 20% threshold. Indeed, the top performance of IRR in absolute terms is verified for 
the same SCUTs when these are compared with their benchmarks. When looking at Beira 
Interior, on contrary, one can deduce that this SCUT is even less profitable when analysed in 
relative terms. This happens because this concession, being the largest, is also facing the 
highest base case WACC among the others. Nevertheless, our estimations point towards a 
significantly lower performance.   
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Figure 8 – Comparison of forecasted IRR against Base Case WACC 
2011 until End of concession
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, (%)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In order to reinforce the results demonstrated by the analysis of the IRR we now provide 
information about the net present value per kilometre in figure 9. It is then possible to notice 
that the same conclusions can be deduced from these results in terms of strong and lower 
performance of SCUTs. However we are now aware of the fact that, although not presenting 
the highest IRR, Beiras Litoral e Alta is the concession which presents the highest NPV per 
kilometre. This situation occurs due to a question of scale, as Beiras Litoral e Alta is the largest 
SCUT among the best performing ones, and therefore presents largest values of annual FCFFs. 
 
Figure 9 – Comparison between NPV estimations from the forecasted assessment profitability and 
Initial CAPEX - 2011 until End of Operation
25
, (€ Thousands)  
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It is also interesting to look at the comparison between the estimations of NPV/Km and the 
initial CAPEX/Km. We see that some concessions, as Grande Porto, are showing a much lower 
NPV/Km than CAPEX/Km which is being reflected in the profitability. On the other hand, we 
can verify that Algarve is the SCUT with the lowest value of CAPEX/Km which can have 
contributed to its good performance, if not in the early years at least in the long term, 
according to our analysis. Likewise, it is possible to deduce that Beiras Litoral e Alta, which is 
roughly smaller than Beira Interior, has invested more in initial CAPEX and that this is reflected 
in a higher performance, both verified in early years and in the long run. 
 
In a complementary approach, the estimations of ROE and its comparison against the base 
case Re are presented in following Table VII and figure 10.  
 
Table VII – Return on equity estimations from the forecasted assessment profitability, (%) 
This table provides the results of the forecasted ROE estimations. As the ROE is a non-constant measure calculated 
annually, the results presented in the table are those of the weighted average return of the period on equity for 
each SCUT. This weighted average is calculated for each firm as:  
∑      
∑           
, where t is the first year of the period 
considered and T the last year.  * Equity weighted average.  n.a. – not applicable 
 
ROE 
2011 until end of 
concession
26
 
Base case Re 
ROE – Base case 
Re (p.p) 
N/F 
Algarve 45,1 7,7 37,4 F 
Interior Norte 42,0 13,2 28,8 F/N 
Norte Litoral 30,8 6,4 24,4 F 
SCUTs Average* 23,0 11,7 11,3 n.a 
Grande Porto 21,9 12,2 9,7 N 
Beiras Litoral e Alta 18,2 13,1 5,1 N 
Beira Interior 14,2 13,0 1,2 N 
Costa de Prata 7,3 11,9 -4,6 N 
Source – Authors  
 
Figure 10 - Comparison of forecasted return on equity 
27
 against base case Re 
2011 – End of concession
28
, (%)  
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 The results presented in the figure are those of the weighted average return on equity of the period for each 
SCUT, calculated as described in Table VII 
 
Source - Authors 
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The results are consistent with the above illustrated. However, it is to notice the quite 
important values of ROE for the three concessions that are above the SCUTs average. Algarve 
is once more on the top of the ranking, both in absolute terms as relatively to its benchmark. 
We relate these results of ROE with high forecasted net income obtained by efficient cost 
structures which, with the current payment values, lead to high margins. In Table VIII we 
present information on the SCUTs’ margins, both historical and forecasted. We see that our 
forecasts point to slightly lower margins while maintaining the same pattern for each SCUT. 
The results, which demonstrate quite important values of margins for all SCUTs, can be closely 
related to the estimations of ROE as the SCUTs with higher margins are those which are best 
performing in our forecasted scenario. 
Table VIII – Historical and forecasted margins, (%) 
This table shows the results of the calculation of gross margins and profit margins. The margins are non-constant 
annual values, therefore the values here presented are weighted averages of the periods analysed. Hence, gross 
margins are calculated as:   
∑           
 
 
∑          
 
 
, where t is the first year of the period and T the last year of the period. 
Historical gross margins are calculated for the period between the entrance into operation
29  and 2010. The 
forecasted gross margins are calculated for the period between 2011 and the end of concession
30
. Forecasted profit 
margins are calculated as: 
∑            
 
 
∑          
 
 
, where t is the first year of the period and T the last year of the period. 
Forecasted profit margins are calculated for the period between 2011 and the end of concession
31
. N – National; F – 
Foreign; F/N – both foreign and national. 
 
Historical Gross 
margins 
Forecasted Gross 
margins 
Forecasted Profit 
Margins 
 N/F* 
Norte Litoral 92,3 87,9 40,9  F 
Interior Norte 91,2 90,7 36,9  F/N 
Beiras Litoral e Alta  88,3 89,2 30,8  N 
Algarve 87,0 87,0 39,3  F 
Beira Interior 86,8 76,2 15,6  N 
Grande Porto 84,0 90,3 34,2  N 
Costa de Prata 72,9 64,6 9,2  N 
Source – Authors  
 
It is worth mentioning that the high values of ROE verified are also related with the high 
leverage level of the generality of SCUTs. Interior Norte, for example, has a base case debt 
level of 98% (see table I). By definition of the ROE (see equation 5), low values of equity lead to 
higher ROE. We choose to use the information provided by the ROE only as complement of the 
IRR analysis, because the IRR is less sensitive to this leverage question (although not 
completely). This is also the reason why we do not use any criterion on the ROE to construct a 
renegotiation scenario. As the ROE estimated are so high in some cases, to renegotiate the 
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state payments in order to bring them to the “fair” level would impose a too strict reduction 
on the state payments that would decreases the IRR below the base case WACC and therefore 
lead to negative NPVs. 
Main findings 
The results found through the SCUTs forecasted profitability analysis give evidence of the 
existence of excessive returns on four of the seven concessions: Algarve, Beiras Litoral e Alta, 
Norte Litoral and Interior Norte. Indeed, the three main indicators evaluated (IRR, NPV and 
ROE) systematically points toward these four concessions as being performing above their 
benchmarks. Furthermore, we infer that these results are related with the value of State 
payments renegotiated in 2010, which benefits these concessions, and to the higher efficiency 
costs that these concessions showed in the past, which we assume they will continue to 
demonstrate in the future.  
We are lead to trust on the robustness of our results as, additionally to the forecast 
assessment made with our final assumptions (detailed in table III), several simulations using 
different assumptions for costs and investment in networking capital (namely) were tested 
before. From these several simulations, we observed that the results in terms of excessive 
returns were quite recurrent, being Norte Litoral the more sensitive SCUT to changes in 
assumptions. Furthermore, the levels of excess returns are so important for Interior Norte, 
Algarve and Beiras Litoral e Alta that the conclusion on excessive returns is robust to 
thresholds higher than 20%.  
4.3. Renegotiations Scenarios  
After having concluded about the SCUTs showing evidence on excessive returns, we then 
perform our renegotiation scenario. Recalling the methodology, we have first applied a 
percentage “discount” on all the state payments, from 2011 until the end of the concession, in 
the SCUTs showing excessive returns. This discount was obtained by finding the maximum 
percentage cut that brings the IRR to the “fair return”, which is 120% of the base case WACC.  
The results of this renegotiation scenario are detailed in Table IV, in terms of impacts on the 
present value of the State payments, main profitability measures for the SCUT and debt credit 
coverage ratio. In terms of impacts on the State payments, we verify that the renegotiations 
that we propose permits saving, in the most favourable case (Interior Norte) €414 Million in 
the present value of the payments currently agreed for this SCUT and, in the least favourable 
case (Norte Litoral) €151 Million. Aggregating the savings of the four SCUTs under analysis, we 
reach a total saving of €838 Million in the present value of the aggregate SCUTs’ payment, 
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which corresponds to a decrease of 9% of the current payments’ present value. Looking at the 
impacts on the profitability of the projects, we see decreases of, on average, 33% in the IRR, 
69% in the NPV and 29% in the ROE. However, by definition we know that the IRR continue to 
be above the base case WACC (20%) and that the ROE are still high as these SCUTs were 
showing, before the renegotiations, high levels of ROE. In terms of impacts on the annual 
State’s payments from 2012 to 2018, the savings reach on average €64 Million per year (9% 
less than the current values). In what concerns the impacts on the debt service coverage ratio, 
this measure is reduced in all the renegotiations. Indeed in three of them – Interior Norte, 
Algarve and Beiras Litoral e Alta – the new DSCR falls below the “security threshold” that we 
defined as 1.1. Therefore, we have to impose a new scenario of renegotiation for these SCUTs 
to maintain the DSCR at the security level.  
The results of the second renegotiation scenario, that takes into account the security limit for 
the DSCR, are described in Table X. It is possible to see that the total savings achieved through 
this solution are considerably lower than in the previous scenario. The total amount saved in 
the payments’ present value is now €631 Million, (25% less than in our first scenario). Looking 
individually at each SCUT, Algarve presents in this scenario savings of 16% of the present value 
of State payments, whereas Beiras Litoral e Alta is able to save merely 3% (versus 22% and 4%, 
respectively). Therefore the impacts on the profitability measures of each SCUT are clearly 
lessen under this scenario comparing with the previous one. Furthermore, the annual savings 
that the State is able to accomplish from 2012 to 2018 are now reduced to achieve, on 
average, €48 Million. 
Main findings 
The results of the renegotiation scenarios that are proposed in this thesis point towards the 
possibility of significant savings for the State in terms of the current amounts of SCUTs’ 
payments. Indeed, in the best scenario the State is able to reduce the present value of these 
payments on about 9%, i.e. paying less €838 Million.  However, our analysis shows that the 
impacts of these renegotiations on the debt service coverage ratio of certain SCUTs are 
extremely important and can be a barrier to practical renegotiations. In fact, the banks 
involved in the concessions’ financing are an active agent on the renegotiations process, and 
that they care for their interests to be protected in all situations. Under the renegotiation 
scenario that maintains the debt service coverage ratio at the security level, we conclude that 
the savings are considerably reduced when comparing with the previous situation. 
Nevertheless, we consider that this scenario could be more realistic than the previous one. 
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Table IX – Results of the first renegotiation scenario, without restricting the DSCR 
(€ Thousands, unless further indication) 
This table presents summary results of the first renegotiation scenario. It presents the values for several indicators 
before and after the renegotiation, and the percentage variation between the two. The savings in the present value 
of the state payments are presenting next to the concessions’ name. Present values are computed applying a 
discount rate of 4,5%. The WACC is computed as ∑
       
       
                      ∑
     
        
           
 
 . The 
final rows present the annual aggregate State payments to all SCUTs between 2012 and 2018 before and after this 
renegotiations scenario. 
 Before After Variation 
INTERIOR NORTE – PV Savings: 413 517    
Present Value of payments 1 557 804 1 144 287 -27% 
IRR (%) 12,5 5,64 -55% 
NPV 282 544 32 304 -89% 
WACC (%) 15,0 8,3 -45% 
ROE (%) 42,0 19,7 -53% 
DSCR (x) 1,39 1,01 -28% 
PV of payments as percentage in GDP 2011 (%) 0,9 0,7 -0,2 p.p 
ALGARVE – PV Savings: 194 880    
Present Value of payments 707 009 512 129 -28% 
IRR (%) 10,8 6,3 -42% 
NPV 131 819 22 917 -83% 
WACC (%) 19,7 11,2 -43% 
ROE (%) 45,1 22,0 -51% 
DSCR (x) 1,33 0,94 -29% 
PV of payments as percentage in GDP 2011 (%) 0,4 0,3 -0,1 p.p 
BEIRAS LITORAL E ALTA – PV Savings: 78 357 
Present Value of payments 1 862 878 1 784 520 -4% 
IRR (%) 7,2 6,6 -8% 
NPV 118 776 76 032 -36% 
WACC (%) 11 10,2 -8% 
ROE (%) 18 16,3 -10% 
DSCR (x) 1,13 1,08 -4% 
PV of payments as percentage in GDP 2011 (%) 1,09 1,04 -0,1 p.p 
NORTE LITORAL – PV Savings: 151 017    
Present Value of payments 999 939 848 921 -15% 
IRR (%) 9,3 6,9 -26% 
NPV 128 880 37 601 -71% 
WACC (%) 25,2 20,5 -18% 
ROE (%) 30,8 22,5 -27% 
DSCR (x) 1,48 1,21 -18% 
PV of payments as percentage in GDP 2011 (%) 0,58 0,49 -0,1 p.p 
TOTAL PV SAVINGS: 837 771  
PV total SCUTs payments 8 823 595 7 985 823 -9% 
As % of GDP 5,1 4,7 -0,5 p.p 
PV total PPPs payments 26 004 000 25 166 229 -3,2% 
As % of GDP 15,1 14,7 -0,5 p.p 
 
 
Before After Absolute Variation % Variation 
2012 835 000 766 855 68 145 -8,2% 
2013 772 000 704 460 67 540 -8,7% 
2014 751 000 684 802 66 198 -8,8% 
2015 746 000 680 181 65 819 -8,8% 
2016 728 000 665 007 62 993 -8,7% 
2017 704 000 643 994 60 006 -8,5% 
2018 689 000 629 123 59 877 -8,7% 
Source – Authors 
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Table X - Results of the second renegotiation scenario, with restriction of the DSCR to 1,10x 
(€ Thousands, unless further indication) 
This table presents summary results of the second renegotiation scenario. It presents the values for several 
indicators before and after the renegotiation, the percentage variation between the two and the percentage 
variation that was achieved in the first scenario. The savings in the present value of the state payments are 
presenting next to the concessions’ name. Present values are computed applying a discount rate of 4,5% . The 
WACC is computed as ∑
       
       
                      ∑
     
        
           
 
 . 
 
 Before After Variation 
First 
scenario’s 
variation 
INTERIOR NORTE – PV Savings: 312 722     
Present Value of payments 1 557 804 1 245 082 -20% -27% 
IRR (%) 12,5 7,32 -41% -55% 
NPV 282 544 93 478 -67% -89% 
WACC (%) 15,0 9,9 -34% -45% 
ROE (%) 42,0 25,2 -40% -53% 
DSCR (x) 1,39 1,10 -21% -28% 
PV payments as percentage in GDP 2011 (%) 0,9 0,7 -0,20 p.p -0,23 p.p 
ALGARVE – PV Savings: 114 394     
Present Value of payments 707 009 592 615 -16% -22% 
IRR (%) 10,8 8,2 -24% -34% 
NPV 131 819 67 894 -48% -77% 
WACC (%) 19,7 14,7 -25% -36% 
ROE (%) 45,1 31,5 -30% -43% 
DSCR (x) 1,33 1,10 -17% -24% 
PV payments as percentage in GDP 2011 (%) 0,4 0,3 -0,70 p.p -0,09 p.p 
BEIRAS LITORAL E ALTA – PV Savings: 52 675  
Present Value of payments 1 862 878 1 810 203 -3% -4% 
IRR (%) 7,2 6,77 -6% -8% 
NPV 118 775,57 90 041,53 -24% -36% 
WACC (%) 11 10,5 -5% -8% 
ROE (%) 18 16,9 -7% -10% 
DSCR (x) 1,13 1,10 -3% -4% 
PV payments as percentage in GDP 2011 (%) 1,09 1,05 -0,04 p.p -0,05 p.p 
NORTE LITORAL – PV Savings: 151 017     
Present Value of payments 999 939 848 921 -15% n.a 
IRR (%) 9,3 6,9 -26% n.a 
NPV 128 880 37 601 -71% n.a 
WACC (%) 25,2 20,5 -18% n.a 
ROE (%) 30,8 22,5 -27% n.a 
DSCR (x) 1,48 1,21 -18% n.a 
PV of payments as percentage in GDP 2011 (%) 0,58 0,49 -0,09 p.p n.a 
TOTAL PV SAVINGS: 630 807   
PV total SCUTs payments 8 823 595 8 192 787 -7% -9% 
As % of GDP 5,1 4,8  -0,5 p.p -0,5 p.p 
PV total PPPs payments 26 004 000 25 373 193 -2,43% -3,2% 
As % of GDP 15,1 14,8 0,5 p.p -0,5 p.p 
 
 Before After Absolute Variation % Variation 
2012 835 000 783 863 51 137 -6,1% 
2013 772 000 721 118 50 882 -6,6% 
2014 751 000 701 124 49 876 -6,6% 
2015 746 000 696 374 49 626 -6,7% 
2016 728 000 680 565 47 435 -6,5% 
2017 704 000 658 868 45 132 -6,4% 
2018 689 000 644 023 44 977 -6,5% 
Source – Authors 
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V. Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis was to infer about the existence of excessive returns in the SCUTs’ 
PPPs projects in Portugal and, thereby, exploit the possibility of renegotiations benefiting the 
Portuguese State by allowing for savings in the amounts it is currently committed to pay.  
We used data available in the annual reports of each SCUT as well as information on the 
SCUTs’ base case from GASEPC32, the Portuguese Court of Audit and the Portuguese Road 
Infrastructure Institute. The study was conducted in three steps: SCUTs’ historical profitability 
assessment (between 2004 and 2010, when the new payment mechanism was implemented); 
SCUTs’ forecasted profitability assessment (between 2011 and the concessions’ final year); 
renegotiation scenarios’ construction and its application to the concessions showing evidence 
on excessive returns. The relevant literature on excessive returns assessment and public 
utilities valuation led us to consider as evidence of excessive returns the situations where the 
internal rate of return exceeds in more than 20% the weighted cost of capital. Positive net 
present values and returns on equity higher than the cost of equity were then used to 
corroborate the conclusions. For the forecasted assessment, several assumptions based on 
past indicators, macroeconomic conditions and business knowledge were formulated. Two 
scenarios of renegotiations by means of reducing the state payments were then designed for 
the SCUTs that were presenting evidence on excessive returns. The first does not restrict the 
renegotiation to the debt service coverage ratio “security level” maintenance. The other 
scenario imposes such restriction in order to capture the involvement of the banks in this 
process. Finally, the impacts of these two renegotiations scenario on the State payments, 
projects’ profitability and projects’ debt service coverage ratio were measured.    
From the historical profitability assessment, the study concludes that Costa de Prata is the 
concession showing stronger evidence on excessive returns. The fact that this SCUT received in 
the early years of its operation higher payments by the State than others comparable in terms 
of size and CAPEX (Algarve and Norte Litoral) led to higher net income at the early stage and 
explain these results. On the other hand, the historical profitability assessment indicates that 
some concessions as Interior Norte and Norte Litoral were performing below the expected at 
first years of operations, mainly due to delays in construction. 
The forecasted profitability assessment presents evidence on the existence of excessive 
returns in four of the seven SCUTs: Interior Norte, Algarve, Beiras Litoral e Alta and Norte 
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Litoral. The results, which strongly contrast with those of the historical assessment, are mainly 
explained by two factors: the increase in the State payments that were agreed when the new 
payment mechanism was implemented (2010) which particularly benefit these concessions 
(comparing with the base case conditions); lower pasts O&M costs and consequent higher 
margins observed in these concessions and that we assume are maintained throughout the 
length of the concession. This study also inferred high ROEs in both the historical and 
forecasted estimations. We relate these results, in part, to the high levels of leverage of most 
of the SCUTs. 
We further conclude that renegotiations on the State payments that re-establish “fair” levels 
of return allow for the saving of €830 Million in the aggregate SCUTs payments’ present value. 
Nonetheless, we also find that renegotiation of such extent threaten the security level of debt 
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of the projects. Renegotiating payments taking into account a 
minimum security level of 1,1 for the DSCR would permit savings of €631 Million (lowers than 
in the previous scenario). However we find that this solution could be more realistic as it takes 
into account that the banks that feel their interest threatened can block renegotiations.  
The limitations of this work related to the methodology used are, at first, the use of specific 
ratios to assess for excessive returns – TIRR on base case WACC and ROE on base case Re – 
which can be a limitative approach. Similarly, the use of a specific threshold of 20% of IRR’s 
excess on the base case WACC as main criterion for excessive returns, without comparing this 
value with national or international data for the specific business we are analysing. Finally, the 
fact that the forecasted analysis is based on several assumptions formulated through historical 
analysis however without guarantee that the historical pattern will maintain in the future. For 
example, future unexpected shocks likely to affect the SCUTs costs structure, which is 
significantly impacting our final results, were not taking into account for the analysis.  
The contribution of this thesis could be complemented by different approaches to calculate 
excessive returns, as using different profitability measures, different thresholds or 
international comparable firms. Moreover, different scenarios of renegotiations could be 
constructed in order to capture not only the value of the State payments, but also the 
distribution of these payments along the length of the concession. Eliminating the 
concentration of the payments in the next years could be an option analysed. The reduction of 
the services for which the State is currently compensating the concessioners, comparing it with 
the adoption of outsourcing solutions is another possible scenario. Other aspect for 
complementing this work is the analysis of the risk of financial rebalancing of the SCUTs that 
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are performing under the base case, and at what extend this would lower the benefits brought 
by the renegotiations proposed. Finally, the legal assessment of the renegotiations that we 
propose would complement this work in terms of practical application. 
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VII. Appendix A 
 
Table I – SCUTs’ State payments: Base case (before 2010 renegotiations) 
(€ Thousands) 
 
Beira 
Interior 
Beiras 
Litoral e 
Alta 
Interior 
Norte 
Algarve 
Norte 
Litoral 
Costa de 
Prata 
Grande 
Porto 
TOTAL 
         
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 9 985 2 410 1 651 3 631 1 864 1 315 1 204 22 060 
2004 14 662 2 653 4 626 21 788 1 864 3 434 2 481 51 508 
2005 150 773 3 440 9 908 32 750 2 993 47 652 6 208 253 724 
2006 129 607 5 400 26 325 34 420 28 785 68 085 36 646 329 268 
2007 131 489 123 520 129 849 35 620 44 239 72 185 51 616 588 518 
2008 138 789 186 851 122 341 37 021 46 086 74 679 52 887 658 654 
2009 141 939 180 002 123 996 38 481 47 986 70 988 64 728 668 120 
2010 145 357 178 350 118 647 40 004 49 982 86 320 59 980 678 640 
2011 151 683 184 697 118 634 41 593 51 724 85 525 70 148 704 004 
2012 154 437 167 666 114 530 42 565 53 403 84 568 78 695 695 864 
2013 160 486 142 323 119 473 43 830 55 041 54 948 73 982 650 083 
2014 186 134 133 173 113 790 45 134 66 649 85 334 77 567 707 781 
2015 167 457 134 622 127 130 46 479 58 238 68 055 80 737 682 718 
2016 159 071 139 347 106 151 47 867 59 813 70 414 79 918 662 581 
2017 163 896 144 967 105 871 49 299 61 355 72 446 88 168 686 002 
2018 115 647 150 770 106 182 50 776 62 886 74 533 84 684 645 478 
2019 113 862 156 761 107 470 52 300 64 412 74 346 97 475 666 626 
2020 101 709 167 945 109 867 53 872 65 941 71 489 96 009 666 832 
2021 94 002 167 440 107 198 55 494 67 462 75 901 43 431 610 928 
2022 91 082 164 090 108 847 56 633 68 994 65 375 63 945 618 966 
2023 82 603 162 566 100 042 58 007 70 509 68 707 67 364 609 798 
2024 39 614 165 614 95 545 59 415 72 029 71 331 72 154 575 702 
2025 40 588 154 363 92 945 60 858 73 567 34 807 73 400 530 528 
2026 41 555 105 449 29 914 62 336 75 112 38 051 71 792 424 209 
2027 45 518 77 810 20 442 63 852 76 667 35 584 76 442 396 315 
2028 43 475 76 134 21 004 65 405 78 229 31 049 78 416 393 712 
2029 31 160 74 713 21 161 66 997 79 800 31 925 64 402 370 158 
2030 0 75 025 21 534 23 589 81 348 9 831 70 616 281 943 
2031 0 25 547 0 0 120 302 0 25 268 171 117 
NPV 4,5% 1 432 878 1 530 001 1 071 988 554 687 671 086 771 787 767 337 6 799 764 
NPV 6% 1 163 940 1 195 799 851 207 431 968 509 565 616 495 592 661 5 361 635 
 
 
 
Source – Court of Audits (2003 Report) 
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Table II - SCUTs’ State payments: current agreements (after 2010 renegotiations) 
(€ Thousands) 
 
Beira 
Interior 
Beiras 
Litoral e 
Alta 
Interior 
Norte 
Algarve 
Norte 
Litoral 
Costa de 
Prata 
Grande 
Porto 
Total 
2011 155 000 175 000 442 000 49 000 59 000 85 000 98 000 106 3000 
2012 191 000 179 000 135 000 51 000 71 000 98 000 110 000 835 000 
2013 185 000 150 000 134 000 52 000 75 000 71 000 105 000 772 000 
2014 179 000 142 000 127 000 54 000 77 000 62 000 110 000 751 000 
2015 174 000 142 000 125 000 54 000 78 000 70 000 103 000 746 000 
2016 159 000 144 000 113 000 55 000 78 000 73 000 106 000 728 000 
2017 153 000 146 000 102 000 55 000 77 000 66 000 105 000 704 000 
2018 133 000 149 000 100 000 56 000 77 000 68 000 106 000 689 000 
2019 95 000 152 000 100 000 56 000 77 000 68 000 110 000 658 000 
2020 84 000 155 000 100 000 57 000 77 000 64 000 110 000 647 000 
2021 83 000 156 000 98 000 57 000 77 000 66 000 112 000 649 000 
2022 78 000 150 000 96 000 58 000 77 000 62 000 111 000 632 000 
2023 73 000 147 000 90 000 58 000 77 000 61 000 109 000 615 000 
2024 52 000 148 000 85 000 59 000 78 000 61 000 107 000 590 000 
2025 41 000 145 000 81 000 59 000 77 000 38 000 105 000 546 000 
2026 39 000 116 000 48 000 60 000 77 000 31 000 103 000 474 000 
2027 39 000 101 000 27 000 60 000 77 000 32 000 96 000 432 000 
2028 38 000 97 000 24 000 61 000 78 000 30 000 93 000 421 000 
2029 25 000 80 000 24 000 66 000 77 000 29 000 91 000 392 000 
2030 0 72 000 24 000 10 000 77 000 7 000 84 000 274 000 
2031 0 16 000 0 0 51 000 0 81 000 148 000 
2032 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 000 65 000 
NPV 4,5% 1 474 509 1 862 878 1 557 804 707 009 999 939 804 546 1 416 910 8 823 595 
NPV 6% 1 431 703 1 791 126 1 514 589 677 164 956 034 776 849 1 355 238 8 502 704 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source – GASEPC  – Gabinete de Acompanhamento do Sector Empresarial do Estado, Parcerias e Concessões 
(2011 Report) 
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Table III – Absolute difference between current payments and base case payments 
(€ Thousands) 
 
Beira 
Interior 
Beiras 
Litoral e 
Alta 
Interior 
Norte 
Algarve 
Norte 
Litoral 
Costa de 
Prata 
Grande 
Porto 
Total 
2011 3 317 -9 697 323 366 7 407 7 276 -525 27 852 358 996 
2012 36 563 11 334 20 470 8 435 17 597 13 432 31 305 139 136 
2013 24 514 7 677 14 527 8 170 19 959 16 052 31 018 121 917 
2014 -7 134 8 827 13 210 8 866 10 351 -23 334 32 433 43 219 
2015 6 543 7 378 -2 130 7 521 19 762 1 945 22 263 63 282 
2016 -71 4 653 6 849 7 133 18 187 2 586 26 082 65 419 
2017 -10 896 1 033 -3 871 5 701 15 645 -6 446 16 832 17 998 
2018 17 353 -1 770 -6 182 5 224 14 114 -6 533 21 316 43 522 
2019 -18 862 -4 761 -7 470 3 700 12 588 -6 346 12 525 -8 626 
2020 -17 709 -12 945 -9 867 3 128 11 059 -7 489 13 991 -19 832 
2021 -11 002 -11 440 -9 198 1 506 9 538 -9 901 68 569 38 072 
2022 -13 082 -14 090 -12 847 1 367 8 006 -3 375 47 055 13 034 
2023 -9 603 -15 566 -10 042 -7 6 491 -7 707 41 636 5 202 
2024 12 386 -17 614 -10 545 -415 5 971 -10 331 34 846 14 298 
2025 412 -9 363 -11 945 -1 858 3 433 3 193 31 600 15 472 
2026 -2 555 10 551 18 086 -2 336 1 888 -7 051 31 208 49 791 
2027 -6 518 23 190 6 558 -3 852 333 -3 584 19 558 35 685 
2028 -5 475 20 866 2 996 -4 405 -229 -1 049 14 584 27 288 
2029 -6 160 5 287 2 839 -997 -2 800 -2 925 26 598 21 842 
2030 0 -3 025 2 466 -13 589 -4 348 -2 831 13 384 -7 943 
2031 0 -9 547 0 0 -69 302 0 55 732 -23 117 
2032 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 000 65 000 
NPV 4,5% 14 944 -307 980 -528 943 140 329 522 787 1 025 285 -791 865 632 
NPV 6% 426 536 -65 183 -255 938 333 648 844 370 1 389 353 281 506 4 686 676 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source – Authors 
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Figure 2 – State payments to the SCUT Interior Norte before and after the first renegotiation scenario, 
2011-2030, (€ Thousand) 
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Figure 1 – Aggregate current SCUTs payments per year 
2011 – 2032, (€ Thousands) 
Source – GASEPC  – Gabinete de Acompanhamento do Sector Empresarial do Estado, Parcerias e Concessões 
(2011 Report) 
